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I Introduction
This IDS Bulletin presents the key background
papers from a major conference on the East Asian
Crisis held at the IDS in July 1998.1 This confer-
ence brought together a distinguished group of
international participants with different perspec-
tives, experiences and institutional affiliations.
Included were experts on international finance,
macroeconomic and social policy, and develop-
ment strategy The discussions from the IDS con-
ference then fed into a seminar on the Asian crisis,
hosted by the Secretary of State for International
Development.2
At each turn, the current international financial
turmoil has defied prediction. In the first instance,
it was unforeseen. The speed with which it struck,
its magnitude and the extent of its contagion have
combined in a major blow to policymakers every-
where. It has stubbornly refused to respond to a
standard package of international rescue measures.
In the four months since the IDS conference, we
have witnessed a spreading contagion that has
destabilised currency and stock markets around
the world and converted this year's annual meeting
of the World Bank and IMF into a forum on the
threat of recession and global deflation. Markets,
especially in Europe and North America, have
rebounded since mid-October, but heads of state
and finance ministers, evidently far from reassured,
continue to express publicly their deep fears of a
major downturn in 1999.
Furthermore, in late 1998 the world economy is sig-
nificantly different from a year ago, as what started
as a crisis in Asia grew into a global crisis. According
to World Bank estimates (in its Report on Global
Economic Prospects and Developing Countries
1998/9), 36 countries that account for more than 40
per cent of the developing world's GDP and more
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than a quarter of its population is likely to see
negative per capita growth in 1998; in contrast, in
1997, per capita income fell in 21 countries, that
accounted for 7 per cent of the developing world's
population. For all developing countries, per capita
growth is expected to slow down from 3.2 per cent
in 1997 to 0.4 per cent in 1998.
The crisis in East Asia has led to significant
increases in poverty The region's impressive social
gains of previous years that came to be a defining
feature of the 'East Asian Miracle' are now under
threat. The collapse of commodity prices, a direct
result of events in Asia, now threatens the same
consequences in other developing countries. There
are also signs that reactions to the crisis may serve
to undermine a range of recent policy advances,
such as those towards more open trade, in develop-
ing and transition economies. Under these circum-
stances, international investors have become
increasingly risk-averse, pulling out of all but the
safest investments. The fear that this liquidity
crunch was spreading from emerging to more
developed economies was confirmed by the near-
collapse of a major US hedge fund.
The increasing global reach of the crisis has
produced a growing consensus that to understand
what is happening we must think less in terms of an
emerging market crisis and more in terms of an
international crisis originating in emerging market
economies. Not only has this crisis become clearly
international in its coverage, imperfections in the
international financial system itself are now viewed
as among its root causes. Recent events have high-
lighted the stark inconsistency between interna-
tional financial markets, which are increasingly
dynamic and sophisticated, and the adequacy of the
existing institutions, both national and interna-
tional, designed to uphold and regulate them.
It is now clear that the crisis countries in Asia will
experience a sharp contraction in GDP of around 8
per cent in 1998. Global growth will also be
reduced sharply Even more serious are indications
that the severity of the economic contraction is
fuelling a socio-political crisis in East Asia and
beyond. Unemployment has already risen signifi-
cantly Real fears are now expressed concerning the
possibility of extreme political scenarios in some of
the worst affected countries.
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Given this perspective, it comes as no surprise that
many of the papers in this Bulletin and much of the
discussion at the IDS conference focussed on how
to prevent and better manage future crises. There
was also lively debate on steps to be taken immedi-
ately The conference did not result in agreement
on all points, but there was strong consensus that
measures are urgently needed that can address both
the magnitude of the crisis and the complex under-
lying issues giving rise to it. It is hoped that the IDS
conference discussions and policy proposals as rep-
resented in the following collection of papers may
provide a useful contribution for engagement with
these issues and assist in the formulation of the
range of actions and responses that are so urgently
required. At the time of sending this Bulletin to
press, some positive policy steps have been taken
that should help economic recovery worldwide.
These include an easing of monetary policy first in
the United States and then in Europe, progress with
bank revitalisation in Japan, approval by the US
Congress for greater funding for the international
financial institutions, and approval of a package
(both domestic and international) for Brazil that
will hopefully lessen the severity of any possible
crisis in Brazil.
However, as pointed out, more fundamental
reforms are urgently required to make such devel-
opmentally costly crises less likely and to manage
them better if, unfortunately, they do occur. We
hope this Bulletin can contribute to this important
debate.
2 Causes of the Crisis
Domestic factors
In the case of the Asian and other currency crises,
domestic causes generally have their roots in the
large capital inflows experienced by those countries
(Reisen). Indeed, so-called domestic causes, such as
overvalued real exchange rates and rapidly growing
asset prices, were, to an important extent, endoge-
nous effects of massive net capital inflows. It is
extremely difficult to separate domestic from
international factors.
Weakness of the financial system
Financial fragility in Asia, together with an under-
supervised banking sector, was certainly a con-
tributing factor. Although financial reforms were
introduced during the 1980s and the 1990s,
enforcement of financial sector regulation did not
keep pace. It was emphasised at the conference that
even in developed economies, such as the
Scandinavian countries, liberalisation of the domes-
tic financial sector is typically not accompanied by
sufficient improvements in financial sector supervi-
sion, nor, especially, by appropriate enforcement of
such supervision. Kaminski and Reinhart (1996)
find that for the period 1970-95, financial liberali-
sation, followed by private lending booms, played a
significant role in explaining the probability of
banking crises, and that banking crises help predict
currency crises.
In the East Asia case, lending was increasingly
channelled towards property and non-traded activ-
ities. Inadequate banking supervision together with
poor assessments of financial risks largely con-
tributed to the sharp increase of credit towards
unproductive investments. Credit was combined
with the prevalence of large unhedged foreign-cur-
rency-denominated corporate and bank debt.
Overproduction
The Asian crisis was not a crisis of overconsump-
don, as was the case in Mexico in 1994, but one of
overproduction. The lending boom resulting from
capital flows was mainly channelled towards invest-
ment. This overinvestment (reaching in the case of
South Korea and Thailand levels higher than 35 per
cent of GDP during several consecutive years) led
logically to overproduction.
A number of external factors seem to have
contributed to overproduction. These included the
depreciation of the yen against the dollar, which
started in mid-1995. This hit the competitiveness of
East Asian countries, largely because the East Asian
currencies were effectively pegged to the US dollar.
The decline in competitiveness was reinforced by
upward pressures on real exchange rates due to
large capital inflows. Decreasing exports led to
overcapacity, particularly in the auto, electronics
(semi-conductors), and textile industries. The
recession in Japan also contributed to the region's
economic problems as it reduced that country's
demand for imports.
Park and Song stress that it was foreign capital that
led to the investment boom. Looking at the
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correlation between capital-inflow-to-GDP and
current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratios, the authors
show that the liberalisation of the domestic finan-
cial sector, combined with the opening up of the
capital account, increased the availability of foreign
capital and thus largely contributed to the financing
of new projects: 'capital inflow was driving domes-
tic investment, not the other way around' (Park and
Song). This leads us to the factors that relate to the
international environment and which certainly
played the greatest role in triggering the crisis.
External factors
External capital flows
The five Asian crisis countries received extremely
high levels of private external finance between 1994
and 1996, followed by a dramatic reversal of capi-
tal flows in 1997. According to figures from the
Institute of International Finance (11F 1998), the
five East Asian countries hardest hit by the crisis
(South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and
the Philippines) experienced a turnaround of
US$105 billion in a single year - from an inflow of
US$93 billion in 1996, to an estimated outflow of
US$12 billion in 1997. Most of this swing occurred
in commercial bank lending, followed by short-
term portfolio flows, whilst foreign direct
investment (FDI) remained constant.
Not only had the scale of lending grown rapidly in
the 1990s, but its maturity was also increasingly
short, making these countries more vulnerable to a
loss of confidence. In South Korea and Thailand, for
example, about 70 per cent of total international
bank claims had a maturity shorter than a year. The
corresponding figure for Indonesia and Malaysia
was around 60 per cent, At the onset of the crisis,
the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves
in the affected countries ranged from 0.6 for
Malaysia to 2.1 for South Korea. This implied a high
dependence of those countries on the willingness of
foreign creditors to roll over existing short-term
credit.
The steep increase in short-term foreign borrowing
has several causes. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) (1996) argues that an increasing
differential between local and foreign interest rates
driven by tighter domestic monetary policies
encouraged foreign borrowing. Reisen, however,
stresses that, in part, interest rate differentials in
East Asia may have been due to structural
deficiencies in the financial sector. This implies that
liberalising the capital account before these struc-
tural deficiencies were removed may have been
inappropriate.
Changes in perceptions by international
investors and lenders
What seems most disturbing about the Asian crisis
is that it happened to countries that had been so
successful for a long period, not just in terms of
economic growth but also in terms of the great
dynamism of their exports, their low rates of infla-
tion, high rates of savings and a rather equitable
income distribution.
Clearly there were problems in the Asian
economies, some of which are discussed in this
Bulletin. As Griffith-Jones and Reisen show, these
problems did not appear abruptly and cannot
explain the scale of the crisis, nor its timing. Clearly
another causal factor, relating to the international
dimension, and in particular to the behaviour of
international capital flows and to the perceptions of
investors, is extremely important. These factors are
linked to imperfections in international capital mar-
kets which, although a constant feature of financial
markets through time, have had an increasing impact
due to the speed with which markets can react in
today global economy (Griffith-Jones 1998).
Paradoxically, this impact appears strongest for
those economies that either are, or are perceived to
be in the process of becoming, highly successful.
Successful economies offer high returns by way of
yields, as well as capital gains. International
investors, particularly when their path is eased by
capital account liberalisation, tend to rush into such
countries, generating a surge of capital inflows that
affects key economic variables: exchange rates
become overvalued, the prices of key assets, such as
shares or real estate, rise quickly and sharply, and
there is an increase in both real income and per-
ceived wealth. Banks tend to relax lending stan-
dards, lifting liquidity constraints on businesses, as
they assume that current trends will continue. The
balance of payments deteriorates, often quite
rapidly, as both consumption and investment rise.
Initially, this is not seen as a problem, as foreign
lenders and investors are willing to continue lend-
ing or ïnvesting. Economic authorities delay the
4
necessary adjustment, confident that their previous
success will be continued, and that crises happen
elsewhere. This latter problem was particularly seri-
ous in East Asian countries, as these countries had
a long history of growth and no recent experience
of balance of payments crises.
Then, something changes. The change may he
domestic or international, economic or political,
important or relatively small. This change triggers a
sharp modification in perceptions, leading to a large
fall in confidence in the economy among interna-
tionally mobile investors, that is, both foreign
investors and nationals able to take their liquid
assets out. The change of perception tends to he
both large and quick.
In East Asia, clearly the largest reversal of flows
occurred in bank flows, apparently disproportion-
ately by smaller banks, which seem less informed
and more prone to herd behaviour. Park and Song
also analyse the role played by mutual Asian coun-
try funds based in New York in the deepening of the
crisis. They find that the crisis spread from Thailand
to three Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, and that the funds did play
a role as a transmission channel. On the other
hand, Howell argues that the narrowness of local
capital markets did not allow for large liquidations
and thus did not permit foreign institutional
investors to liquidate large amounts of their hold-
ings. Howell believes that hedge funds could have
played an important role in the foreign exchange
markets. In the light of recent studies (Eichengreen
and Mathieson 1998), and of discussions at the IDS
conference, it seems that institutional investors
played a role in triggering the crisis, and particu-
larly in deepening and spreading it within Asia.
Clearly further research is required to understand
the role which different financial actors play in
triggering and deepening currency crises.
Crisis depth and contagion
What was unexpected about the East Asian crisis
was not just that it happened, but that it was so
deep and prolonged, and that contagion in the
region was so virulent. This relates to inappropriate
management of the crisis, both by the crisis coun-
tries and the IMP, as well as to exogenous factors,
such as slow growth and recession in Japan and the
close trade links between the East Asian countries,
which though once a source of strength, soon
became a source of weakness as recession weakened
demand for intra-regional imports.
The East Asian countries had less experience in cri-
sis management than some other regions, such as
Latin America. This may have contributed to initial
delays in recognising the depth of the crisis and the
need to act quickly, as well as to the mistakes in cri-
sis management. Indeed, interesting lessons for Asia
on crisis management and resolution can now be
drawn from Latin America, such as the urgency for
sufficient debt reduction in the initial phases of a
crisis.
Furthermore, the East Asian countries and
especially the IMF faced a new and difficult chal-
lenge. Capital-account-led crises, which relate to
rapid changes in the expectations of private
investors and lenders, may need different responses
to traditional balance of payments crises, provoked
by problems on the current account, and caused by
public sector deficits. In the new capital-account-
led crises, the key challenge is to restore the confi-
dence of private actors. Several conference
participants argued that IMF programmes, with
their stringent macroeconomic conditions and
overambitious requisites for rapid and deep struc-
tural reforms, had been counterproductive for
restoring confidence.
3 Social and Economic Costs
The East Asian 'tiger economies', prior to the cur-
rent crisis, were arguably the most remarkable
development success story of this century These
countries were not only successful in terms of per
capita income growth, but also achieved substantial
poverty reduction. Ranis and Stewart report a
strong decrease in the proportion of the population
classified as poor on the basis of their private
income. Despite some improvements in access to
social services, such as health and education, the
basis of this success in poverty reduction was a sus-
tained period of high and reasonably equitable
private income growth.
Limping tigers
The history of high growth was reversed by the
Reuters, 1998.
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financial crisis of 1997 and gave way to a recession.
Major GDP contractions are expected for the East
Asian crisis countries, whose GDP is expected to fall
on average by 8 per cent during 1998. Despite high
interest rates, the capital that fled the region has not
returned. Financial systems are under great pres-
sure, as private and public debtors stop repay-
ments, tipping more and more companies into
insolvency
The effect of the crisis on Indonesia has been
particularly severe, as GDP is expected to fall by at
least 15 per cent in 1998. The situation of Indonesia
has been complicated by the fact that the country is
simultaneously suffering the effects of the financial
crisis, of political instability and of adverse climatic
conditions. Before the crisis, Indonesia had been
one of the most successful newly industrialised East
Asian countries (World Bank 1998). Following the
dramatic reduction in the proportion of the popula-
tion classified as poor during the period of rapid
growth, to around 15 per cent in 1990, it is now
estimated that 'about half of the country's 200 mil-
lion people will be unable to afford food and basic
needs'.3
Haunting Asia - the vagaries of the spectre
of poverty
The main impact on poverty levels in Asia has come
from rising unemployment and falling wages.
Unemployment in the region has increased
dramatically since the onset of the crisis and is set
to continue increasing in the future. The immediate
effect of this has been a dramatic fall in the income
of the affected workers, since unemployment provi-
sion is almost universally absent (with the partial
exceptions of South Korea and Japan).
Other negative effects of this rise in unemployment
were underlined at the conference. Employees in
the formal urban sector often contributed to the
maintenance of dependent family members, who
now suffer reductions in transfer incomes as these
contributions are no longer available (Robb 1998).
Another labour market phenomenon has been
increased informal-sector participation which cer-
tainly depressed earnings. This has occurred in the
urban informal sector as well as in rural areas.
Increased informal-sector participation is closely
linked to rising female participation, which can take
the form of prostitution; it has also led to an
increase in child labour with the corresponding
adverse effects on education (Robb 1998).
Other factors impacting on living standards have
been price and interest rate rises. Food price rises in
the wake of the crisis have depressed real wages
(Robb 1998). Price rises of imported goods as a
consequence of devaluation are a particularly major
problem. Health service access has worsened as the
price of imported medical drugs has increased.
Interest rate rises have been damaging not only to
local businesses but also to households, who
increasingly find it necessary to access informal
lenders. Credit on informal markets is expensive,
and there are reports of loan sharks increasingly
resorting to violence to recover loans.
Households' coping strategies have incorporated
attempts at expenditure reduction. The burden of
reduced consumption tends to be unequally dis-
tributed within households: women and children
are likely to suffer disproportionately Reduced
health and education spending can be expected to
lead to quantitative reductions in human capital
formation or to lower quality of human capital.
In Southeast Asia, perhaps more so than in other
regions, welfare issues are closely linked to the per-
formance of the external sector. It is evident, there-
fore, that global financial instability can exacerbate
poverty in Asia in a number of ways, not just dur-
ing the current crisis but also in the future, through
adverse effects on productive capacity and on the
quality of the human capital stock.
National policies
If macroeconomic policy measures are to lead to
social improvements, it is important that they are
designed to avoid further recessionary impacts. This
makes it necessary to reconsider the kind of austerity
prescription that has traditionally been implemented
in Latin American crisis scenarios. The IMP has
begun to make some concessions in this direction
after insisting initially on contractionary policies.
A number of concerns should be borne in mind
considering immediate, short-term policy
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measures. Ranis and Stewart point out that macro-
economic measures should aim to restrict unneces-
sary expenditure and that social allocation ratios
should at least be stabilised. They also propose a
series of relief measures on a microeconomic level.
In the long run they suggest that the main concern
should be with establishing universally accessible
social security systems. A key challenge is to make
the implementation of such universal social security
systems affordable in the foreseeable future.
Useful as all these proposals may be, in the long run
there is a more fundamental concern for the region.
Social security systems may help to spread the cost
of the crisis over the whole of society - and this can
make an important difference to those worst
affected. Yet the primary concern should be how to
avoid crises of this kind from occurring in the first
place. In small, open and highly trade-focussed
economies like those of East Asia, any involvement
in international financial turmoil is highly disrup-
tive for the countries' external economic relations in
general. This can be expected to have a highly
recessionary impact which in turn threatens
achievements in poverty reduction.
We therefore now turn to the key issues of crises
prevention and crises management.
4 Policy Implications
Within present arrangements, there is growing
concern that the volatility and reversibility of some
categories of capital flows, as dramatically illus-
trated by the East Asian crisis, implies that the costs
of these flows may outweigh their benefits (at least
during certain periods). As a consequence, there
was broad consensus at the IDS conference that
important changes need to be made in the interna-
tional monetary system as a whole, and in recipient
country policies, to avoid costly crises, as well as to
manage them better if they do occur. Care must be
taken, however, that the measures adopted con-
tribute to broaden access of all developïng countries
to capital flows, particularly long-term ones.
Crisis prevention
Domestic measures in capital-receiving
countries
At the conference, there was consensus that capital
account liberalisation should be done in a very
account liberalisation, based on developmental effi-
ciency, rather than on pressure from interest groups.
The Asian crisis proved again that capital account
liberalisation can only work well if certain precondi-
tions are met, including the appropriate prudential
supervision and regulation of the domestic financial
system. This is a difficult task, particularly, but not
only, in developing countries (as illustrated by the
Scandinavian banking crises). Careful limits also
need to be placed on foreign currency borrowing by
corporate entities, especially local banks. As regards
capital account liberalisation itself, the standard rec-
ommendation that long-term capital flows need to be
liberalised first and short-term flows should be liber-
alised last has been confirmed by events in East Asia.
There is a strong case for market-based 'Chilean-
style' measures (such as non-remunerated reserve
requirements on flows of up to one year) to dis-
courage excessive surges of short-term, potentially
reversible inflows and to improve the maturity
structure of external debt. However, it is important
that such measures should not be seen as a panacea,
but that they should form part of a package of pol-
icy measures that include sound macroeconomic
fundamentals as well as a strong and well-regulated
domestic financial system. During periods of exces-
sive surges of capital inflows, recipient countries
have a greater degree of freedom for policy-making.
Counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies can
play an essential role in reducing excessive growth
of domestic absorption, and/or current account
deficits. It is important that economic authorities
'lean against the wind' with their macroeconomic
policies in periods of large surges of capital inflows
and/or domestic credit booms.
A counter-cyclical approach should also be applied
to the supervision and regulation of the financial
system, and particularly the banking system. In
boom times, supervision and regulation of banks, as
well as credit decisions by banks themselves,
should not be based solely on expectations of a con-
tinued growth scenario among borrowers. Good
economic periods are bad times to evaluate credit-
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requirements for banks can also provide a valuable
additional cushion for downside risks.
An appropriate exchange rate regime is also
essential for relatively small, open economies, so as
to make them less vulnerable to currency attack.
This is a complex issue, and the choice of exchange
rate regime should be linked to the country's spe-
cific circumstances, A freely floating exchange rate
acts as an automatic stabiliser for capital flows, but
can cause competitiveness problems. Fixed
exchange rates offer apparently secure yields to very
short-term investors, and can encourage domestic
corporations to borrow abroad. Furthermore, fixed
exchange rates can, when the situation deteriorates,
offer fixed goal posts for hedge funds and others to
attack. International evidence seems to show that
exchange rate regimes using wide bands, with a
possible crawling peg element, offer a good combi-
nation of flexibility with some desirable guidance to
the market and an anchor for monetary policy
International measures
The current international discussion, in forums like
the G-7, the IMF and the G-22, has stressed
improved information and surveillance of develop-
ing countries as an important mechanism to make
future crises less likely Not enough emphasis is
being placed on international capital market sur-
veillance and regulation, which is very important.
Furthermore, at the conference there was a general
feeling that whilst improved information on coun-
tries is extremely valuable, it is clearly insufficient.
As discussed above, often the key problem is not
lack of information (important as that may be), but
how available informatïon is analysed. Indeed, the
description of a glass as half-empty or half-full does
not depend mainly on whether the glass is clean,
but on the mood of the viewer; similarly, with mar-
kets' perceptions of emerging economies. Therefore,
measures additional to improvement of information
are required, including, in particular, better regula-
tion of international capital flows.
There is a growing consensus on the need to com-
plete and improve international prudential
tional regulation of financial markets (Fitzgerald).
Griffith-Jones identifies two categories of flows to
emerging markets where additional international
and/or source country regulation and supervision
may be particularly necessary: short-term bank loans
and easily reversible portfolio flows. Griffith-Jones
shows how these flows played a prominent role in
sparking off recent currency crises and proposes
changes to, and innovations in, current regulatory
practice designed to reduce the likelihood of future
crises. In the case of bank lending, modifications to
eliminate current regulatory incentives to encourage
short-term bank lending are urgently required. In the
case of institutions like mutual funds an important
regulatory gap exists, as there is no international reg-
ulatory framework for taking account of market and
credit risks on flows originating in institutional
investors; this could perhaps best be achieved by
requiring risk-weighted cash requirements on
mutual funds' investments (Griffith-Jones).
A dynamic risk-weighted cash requirement for
mutual funds (and perhaps other institutional
investors) is in the mainstream of current regulatory
thinking. The guidelines for market risk would take
into account such vulnerability variables as the ratio
of the country's current account deficit (or surplus)
to GDP, the level of its short-term external liabilities
to foreign exchange reserves, the fragility of the
banking system, as well as other country risk fac-
tors. It is important that quite sophisticated analysis
is used, to avoid simplistic criteria stigmatising
countries unnecessarily Introducing risk-weighted
cash requirements on mutual funds would help
achieve a more precise pricing of risk, as well as
help smooth capital flows, thereby avoiding the
boombust behaviour of institutional investors like
mutual funds.
Further study is also urgently required to detect and
cover any other existing monitoring or regulatory
gaps, for example in relation to instruments such as
derivatives, and institutions such as hedge funds.
The possible need to supervise rating agencies may
also require further investigation, as do the norms
that could be set to supervise them adequately.
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capital markets as described above. The aim of such
a proposal is broadly to slow down speculative,
short-term capital flows (which would be more
affected, since by definition they cross borders
often, and would be taxed every time), while having
only a marginal effect on long-term flows. More
generally, a multilateral tax agreement (with effec-
tive multilateral taxation of corporate profits or per-
haps of dividends) could be a desirable step in this
context, Such an agreement, if appropriately struc-
tured, could not only improve the fiscal revenue
position of developing countries and reduce the use
of tax incentives to foreign investors, thus increas-
ing resources for social infrastructure, but also con-
tribute to the stabilisation of financial flows.
lt can be concluded that a package of measures is
needed to make currency crises in emerging mar-
kets far less likely, and therefore ensure the efficient
operation of the market economy in emerging mar-
kets, which should be a basis for sustained devel-
opment. The objective of crises avoidance requires
some discouragement and regulation of excessive
and potentially unsustainable short-term inflows.
Such measures would be most effective if they are
applied both by source and recipient countries
(though the main responsibility lies with recipient
countries), if these measures avoid discouraging
more long-term flows (which on the contrary need
to be encouraged), if the rules designed are simple
and clearly targeted at unsustainable flows and, par-
ticularly, if they are complemented by good policies
in the emerging economies.
Crisis management
Though prevention is far better than cure, if pre-
vention fails and major currency crises do unfortu-
nately occur, measures need to be in place to
manage them as well as possible. Thus, measures
for better crisis management, both nationally and
internationally, are clearly complementary to mea-
sures for crisis prevention.
National measures
The policy options at a domestic level once a
currency crisis explodes are very limited, and the
trade-offs are very problematic. The standard
response required by the markets includes sharp
increases in interest rates and significant fiscal tight-
ening, the latter even in countries with fiscal sur-
pluses. There was a great deal of discussion at the
conference about appropriate macroeconomic
responses to speculative attacks on currencies, with
some disagreements, especially on the correct
response of monetary policy
Some participants, drawing on the experience of
countries like Brazil, Chile and the Czech Republic,
stressed that interest rate increases could be effec-
tive in sorne cases in preventing large currency
depreciations, especially if they were timely, sharp
and temporary. However, other participants argued
that a positive correlation between exchange rates
and interest rates was uncertain, especially in East
Asian countries where companies have high debt
equity ratios. Also, in countries like Malaysia, large
corporations that borrow abroad were hit by depre-
ciation, whilst small companies that borrow domes-
tically were hit by high interest rates. More
generally, the possibility of a Laffer-curve type'
interest rate - exchange rate link was raised; this
would imply that exchange rates could be defended
effectively, using interest rates up to a certain level,
but that the relationship failed to hold beyond a
certain point. There was also broad agreement that
sustained high real interest rates had important neg-
ative effects, both on the financial system and on
the real economy As a consequence, it seemed
desirable that East Asian economies should con-
tinue prudently to lower interest rates. However,
further research is required on interest rate policies
in open economies, that are consistent with cur-
rency stability, strong financial systems and, above
all, sustained growth.
International measures
The first response internationally when a large cur-
rency crisis starts unfolding in one or more coun-
tries is to activate quickly a sufficiently large
financing package, led by the International
Monetary Fund, to provide liquidity A key problem
is that the resources which official sources, and par-
ticularly the IMP, can command are relatively small,
in proportion to the scale of private sector flows.
According to some participants at the conference,
the limited funds of the IMF imply that a very high
proportion of its loans goes indirectly to the
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creditors; furthermore, because creditors are aware
that official funds are limited, they are insufficient
to restore confidence, and may indeed provide an
additional incentive for such funds to leave the
country quickly For these reasons, though official
financing is very large, little of it stays in the domes-
tic economy to help sustain economic recovery The
effects of official financing packages therefore bene-
fit creditors more than developing countries.
To overcome the shortcomings of the current
arrangements, three avenues can be pursued. The
first one is to enhance resources for official, and
other, financing. Given the large scale of the
resources required, and the limitation of IMF
resources, complementary avenues for sufficient
provision of early liquidity need to be explored.
One possible modality is via enhanced central bank
cooperative arrangements, through greatly enlarged
swap arrangements, both within regions as well as
particularly between G-10 members and non-mem-
bers. These could be, for example, coordinated by
the BIS. Another possible avenue is via pre-commit-
ted stand-by arrangements with private banks, as
Argentina and Mexico have arranged; however, these
latter arrangements are still untested, and it is unclear
how well they would operate in a severe crisis.
The second avenue is for the IMP to play a far
greater role in facilitating orderly debt workouts
between developing countries and their creditors,
by encouraging debt reschedulings where the prob-
lem is one of liquidity, and debt reduction where
necessary (for interesting proposals on this, see the
1998 UNCTAD Trade and Development Report).
Also this makes it very important for the G-22 pro-
posals on orderly debt workouts to be imple-
mented. The proposed changes would mean that
the official sector, rather than bailing out private
creditors, could bail them in by enforcing early debt
negotiations. Several participants at the conference
argued that, specifically in the case of some East
Asian countries, debt reduction may be needed to
avoid a lost decade to development', as occurred in
Latin America in the 1980s. Furthermore, as was
shown in the case of Latin America, a reduction in
the debt overhang can help restore confidence to
private investors, both foreign and domestic.
The third avenue to be pursued is to reduce the
likelihood of currency crises, with preventive
measures along the lines discussed above, which
will limit moral hazard and discourage surges of
short-term capital inflows.
Apart from the crucial issue of resources, a number
of other important issues arise relating to the IMFs
role as provider of liquidity, including timing and
conditionality The issue of timing is crucial as cur-
rency crises happen so quickly, due to the speed
with which markets move and overreact. Under
current arrangements, a great deal of damage can
occur in the affected country before official financ-
ing is put in place, and the crisis can spread due to
contagion. A solution worth considering is to have
recourse to IMF-supported preventative pro-
grammes; a countly could make a request for the
right to borrow from the IMF before a crisis hap-
pens, and accept conditionality then. The country
would only be able to draw on this facility if a cri-
sis occurred, but could then do so immediately
A final issue is the nature of IMF conditionality that
should accompany large financial packages, linked
to currency crises. Radelet and Sachs (1998) and
others have argued that some of the IMF condition-
ality (e.g. on bank closures) not only was inappro-
priate, but actually added to, rather than
ameliorated, panic in international credit and capi-
tal markets. It is therefore crucial that, in the new
capital-account led crises, IMF conditionality con-
tributes to rebuild, and not undermine, markets'
confidence in countries. As far as possible, IMF
conditionality should focus on macro-economic
policies (and these should not be excessively con-
tractionary); it should not be too intrusive and
comprehensive in relation to structural reforms.
A new financial architecture
In our discussions at the conference, both on
international measures for currency crisis preven-
tion and management, the focus was on how exist-
ing institutional arrangements might be improved,
and existing gaps might be filled. However, almost
inevitably the discussion was broadened to the
deeper issue of what global governance would look
like if it is to meet development needs in the con-
text of new and globalised private capital and credit
markets.
In particular, three functions of global financial
market management need to be met appropriately:
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The provision of appropriate surveillance and
prudential regulation of financial intermediaries,
both in developing and developed countries.
Though part of this task is carried out by the
Basle Committee and other coordinating regula-
tory mechanisms, important gaps particularly in
international, but also in national, prudential
regulation remain. An interesting question is
how these new needs should be met. An impor-
tant proposal in this context is that presented by
Gordon Brown and Clare Short in the October
1998 Development Committee, for 'a new and
permanent Standing Committee for Global
Financial Regulation, which would bring
together the Basle Committee and other regula-
tory groupings on a regular - perhaps monthly -
basis.' This Committee, which would also
include the IMF and World Bank, would be
charged with developing and implementing a
mechanism to ensure that the necessary interna-
tional standards for financial regulation and
supervision are put in place and properly coor-
dinated. If and when adopted, this would be an
extremely valuable step, particularly if it also
completed existing regulations, by filling regula-
tory gaps. More radical institutional proposals,
like the creation of a World Financial Authority
(Eatwell and Taylor 1998) would have the
advantage of corresponding even more closely to
the new needs of the global economy, but would
be complex to establish and perhaps difficult to
agree internationally; however, these proposals
could possibly best be developed sequentially,
with a Standing Committee for Global Financial
Regulation being a very valuable initial step.
The provision of international official liquidity to
the market, including last-resort lending in dis-
tress conditions. Currently, this function falls
implicitly on the IMF - although it has, at pre-
sent, insufficient funds and can only lend to gov-
ernments, and only does so to emerging
economies' governments. Though performing
valuable functions, the IMP does not act as a
classical lender of the last resort, as it does not
have unlimited liquidity and does not lend to
international banks. Through what mecha-
nisms/institutions should the provision of offi-
cial liquidity be enhanced? Should it continue
to be provided to emerging economy govern-
ments, so as to indirectly help finance
international creditors? Should other
institutions, like the Bank for International
Settlements, or regional bodies, play a larger role
in the provision of official liquidity
3. There are limited methods for orderly debt
workouts, and therefore the weight is on devel-
oping country adjustment and, occasionally and
often too late, on relatively ad hoc debt resched-
ulings and reductions. How should such
international debt workout arrangements best
be developed? What should the institutional
mechanisms for its operation be?
Major changes in institutional structures may be
difficult and time-consuming to achieve. However,
it seems highly desirable to develop a clear vision of
an appropriate international framework that would
allow an orderly global financial market to continue
to support the development process and would
help avoid developmentally and financially costly
crises like the Asian one.
5 Research Implications
Six major research topics clearly emerged at the
conference, as being highly relevant for policy
design and as having very important implications
for long-term development prospects.
(i) On the supply side of capital flows
If there is a great development promise in increased
access to international capital flows, recent experi-
ence also cautions us about the risks involved,
including major and costly currency crises. Given
the large magnitude of capital flows moving into
and out of developing countries, and the large
impact of these flows both on national policies and
on countries' development, it is remarkable how lit-
tie studied the complex factors determining the
supply of these flows have been, The IDS
Conference highlighted the urgency of this
research. Research should be directed towards help-
ing to fill the gap in understanding on the complex
factors that influence the suppiy of capital flows
moving into and out of developing countries. It
should address three specific objectives: first, the
improvement of empirical knowledge regarding
how, and using what criteria, different institutional
investors (pension funds, mutual funds and hedge
funds) and their fund managers as well as banks,
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allocate their assets globally and to developing
countries; Second, the analysis of the empirical evi-
dence gathered, to try to determine if a 'ranking of
volatility' can be established for different types of
institutions; third, the identification of the policy
implications arising from this analysis for both
developed and developing governments, as well as
for international institutions.
Developmental impact of external
capital flows
Standard economic theory assumes that
international capital flows contribute to growth and
development through a number of mechanisms.
However, increasingly, the standard view has been
theoretically challenged. Moreover, there is empiri-
cal evidence that certain categories of flows (espe-
cially short-term, easily reversible flows) have
serious development costs, as dramatically exempli-
fied by the East Asian Crisis. Research in this area
should aim to contribute to the development of a
more consensual view by undertaking further study
of the net growth and development effects of differ-
ent categories of capital inflows and outflows (for-
eign direct investment, portfolio flows, bank loans
of different maturities, etc.) for different types of
developing countries. The conclusions of this
research would have important policy implications
for when and how different categories of developing
countries should liberahse their capital account,
and what regulatory and other measures should
accompany such liberahsation.
Management of capital flows by
developing countries
Research on this topic should examine two
categories of issue, The first is macroeconomic
management, especially of exchange rates and inter-
est rates, for open developing countries. Again the
growth and development impact of different
options should be given highest priority in the
analysis. Second, research undertaken on this issue
should also establish a taxonomy of prudential
measures to discourage excessive inflows of poten-
tially volatile short-term capital. This taxonomy
should include instruments that already exist in a
variety of developing countries (e.g. Chilean-style
non-remunerated reserve requirements as one of
many possibilities) and those that have been imple-
mented in developed economies. A rigorous assess-
ment of the impact of these instruments would be
carried out, as well as an assessment of how they
could best be implemented. This could be helpful
in contributing to develop 'best practice' criteria for
developing countries on prudential measures.
(iv) Overproduction
The East Asian crisis has two particular
characteristics that suggest its importance as a
springboard for future research. First, by (research-
able) hypothesis it is less a crisis of East Asia but
more a global crisis in East Asia. And, second, there
are underlying trajectories in the real economy that
have interacted with global financial flows, boiling
over into the financial turmoil that has beset the
region over the past twelve months. Contrary to
much conventional wisdom, the contribution of the
real economy to the financial crisis is to be found in
the use to which national and foreign savings have
been put in promoting growth through exception-
ally high savings and investment ratios. These
investments have been concentrated in sectors and
in particular niches of sectors, promoting intense
competition. This, in turn, has been reflected in
sharply declining terms of trade and the need for
some competitive devaluations. However, the
nature and extent of this concentrated 'overinvest-
ment' is poorly understood. So, too, are the links
between these concentrated patterns of investment,
financial flows, corporate organisation (for example
high gearing ratios) and domestic financial interme-
diation. A greater understanding of the specific and
generalisable nature of these complex two-way
interactions between the real and financial
economies will be helpful in developing an appro-
priate policy response and thereby avoiding similar
crises both in East Asia and in other regions.
(y) Global financial market management
Research under this heading should examine the
need for development-enhancing management of
global financial markets. In that context, it would
make suggestions for changes to be made by finan-
cial markets themselves (via self-regulation or other
mechanisms), by governments, by regulators, by
international financial institutions and by better
coordination between the different actors. If and
where necessary, due to the existence of clear gaps,
suggestions should be made for institutional devel-
opments. Research should focus on three questions:
how can more long-term capital be attracted to
developing countries, especially the poorest ones?
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How can costly currency and financial crises be pre-
vented? And how can currency crises be better
managed, if they do occur?
(vi) The design of affordable social
protection nets
Currency and financial crises can abruptly increase
poverty and disrupt existing protection mecha-
nisms for the poor - even in countries where
poverty has been falling rapidly - if social protec-
tion nets are not properly developed. The design of
affordable social protection nets is both essential
and difficult for countries undergoing financial and
currency crises, and research is needed on the most
efficient and most cost-effective mechanisms, from
a poverty alleviation perspective, that can be devel-
oped for offering social protection; research ïs also
required on how such social protection can best be
funded, e.g. by increased taxes or cutbacks in non-
essential government spending. The design of
affordable social protection nets must be developed
in forms that are consistent with, and encourage,
economic recovery
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